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Abstract. We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting
and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control
problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions,
viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to be in the (Gilles resp. upward)
uncovered set. For the first condition the control problem is known to
be NP-hard; for the second condition the NP-hardness of the control
problem is shown in the paper. All relation-algebraic specifications we
will develop in the paper immediately can be translated into the pro-
gramming language of the BDD-based computer system RelView. Our
approach is very flexible and especially appropriate for prototyping and
experimentation, and as such very instructive for educational purposes.
It can easily be applied to other voting rules and control problems.
1 Introduction
Elections have been studied by scientists from different disciplines for more than
a thousand years. In addition to the obvious moral and political issues, elections
also give rise to several computational questions, which are studied in the field of
Computational Social Choice. The most prominent of these questions is the re-
quirement of an algorithm that efficiently computes the winner(s) of an election.
Surprisingly, such algorithms do not exist for all natural election systems, see
[12] for an example. However, elections also give rise to computational problems
which ideally should be hard to solve:
– The manipulation problem (see [1]) asks to determine a way for a group of
voters to vote that serves their interest best, even though the vote might not
represent their true preferences. Unfortunately, classical results show that
every reasonable voting system gives voters incentives to vote strategically
in this way (Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, cf. [11,17]).
– The control problem (see, e.g.,[2]) asks for determining a way for the coor-
dinator of an election to set up the election in a way that serves his or her
personal interest. In order to achieve this, the coordinator might remove or
add alternatives or voters from the election or partition the election.
Following the above-mentioned paper [1], numerous papers have studied the com-
plexity of manipulation and control problems for elections (see, e.g., [7,9,13]).
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2 Rudolf Berghammer and Henning Schnoor
For many election systems, it can be shown that the studied control or ma-
nipulation problem is NP-hard, and thus the election system is deemed to be
‘secure’ against this attempt to influence the outcome of the election. However,
it has long been observed that efficient algorithms that work for many cases
can still exist for NP-hard problems, the very successful history of SAT solvers
being an impressive example. In the context of Computational Social Choice, [6]
demonstrates a fast and very simple algorithm that works correctly on ‘most’
inputs (according to a suitably chosen probability distribution) and is allowed
to compute an incorrect result on the remaining inputs.
In this paper, we study an alternative approach to show that NP-hard elec-
tion problems may be solvable in practice. We apply the Computer Algebra
system RelView (see [3,20]), which uses mathematical tools from relation al-
gebra in the sense of [18,19], to implement algorithms for the control problem of
an election. Our implementations are provably correct for all instances; hence,
as the problems we study are NP-hard, our algorithms do not run in polynomial
time in general. Instead, we rely on RelView’s optimization to exploit the sim-
ple structure of most practical instances of the problems we study, which allows
for an algorithmic treatment.
Concretely, we study the following problem: Given an election consisting
of a set of alternatives (also sometimes called candidates), voters along with
information on how they will vote, and a prefered alternative a∗, determine a
minimum set Y of voters such that removing all voters in Y makes a∗ win the
election. The election system we study is the Condorcet voting system with the
uncovered set winning condition (in case there is no Condorcet winner). To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper where a relation-algebraic approach
is used to solve problems related to elections that directly take the individual
votes into account. An advantage of our approach is that it is very general
and allows to treat related problems for different election systems with only
small modifications. In particular, we could also treat elections in a generalized
setting, where voters’ preferences are not linear orders (such a setting is studied
in [10]). A further advantage is that the correctness proofs for our algorithms
are formalized in such a way that, in principle, their automatic verification is
possible. Our results and the performance of our algorithms demonstrate that
Computer Algebra tools can be used successfully to solve NP-hard problems,
where the data structures used in the Computer Algebra package automatically
allow to exploit the ‘easyness’ that may be present in practical instances. In our
case, RelView uses BDDs to efficiently represent relations that are exponential
in the input size. Thus, relation-algebraic algorithms can be obtained without
specific knowledge about the problem domain.
2 Relation-algebraic Preliminaries
Given sets X and Y , we write R : X↔Y if R is a (binary) relation with source
X and target Y , i.e., a subset of X×Y . If the sets of R’s type X↔Y are finite,
then we may consider R as a Boolean matrix. Since such an interpretation is
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well suited for many purposes and also used by RelView as the main possibility
to visualize relations, in this paper we frequently use matrix terminology and
notation. Especially, we speak about the entries, rows and columns of a rela-
tion/matrix and write Rx,y instead of (x, y) ∈ R or xR y. We assume the reader
to be familiar with the basic operations on relations, viz. RT (transposition), R
(complement), R ∪ S (union), R ∩ S (intersection) and R;S (composition), the
predicates R ⊆ S (inclusion) and R = S (equality), and the special relations Ø
(empty relation),  L (universal relation) and I (identity relation). In case of Ø,  L
and I we overload the symbols, i.e., avoid the binding of types to them.
For R : X↔Y and S : X↔Z, by syq(R,S) = RT S ∩ RT S their symmetric
quotient syq(R,S) : Y ↔Z is defined. In the present paper we will only use its
point-wise description, saying that for all y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z it holds syq(R,S)y,z
iff for all x ∈ X the relationships Rx,y and Sx,z are equivalent.
In relation algebra vectors are a well-known means to model subsets of a
given set X. Vectors are relations r : X↔1 (we prefer in this context lower case
letters) with a specific singleton set 1 = {⊥} as target. They can be considered
as Boolean column vectors. To be consonant with the usual notation, we omit
always the second subscript, i.e., write rx instead of rx,⊥. Then r describes the
subset Y of X if for all x ∈ X it holds rx iff x ∈ Y . A point p : X↔1 is a
vector with precisely one 1-entry. Consequently, it describes a singleton subset
{x} of X and we then say that it describes the element x of X. If r : X↔1 is
a vector and Y the subset of X it describes, then inj(r) : Y ↔X denotes the
embedding relation of Y into X. In Boolean matrix terminology this means that
inj(r) is obtained from I : X↔X by deleting all rows which do not correspond
to an element of Y and point-wisely this means that for all y ∈ Y and x ∈ X it
holds inj(r)y,x iff y = x.
In conjunction with powersets 2X we will use membership relations M :
X↔ 2X and size comparison relations S : 2X↔ 2X . Point-wisely they are de-
fined for all x ∈ X and Y,Z ∈ 2X as follows: Mx,Y iff x ∈ Y and SY,Z iff
|Y | ≤ |Z|. A combination of M with embedding relations allows a column-wise
enumeration of an arbitrary subset S of 2X . Namely, if the vector r : 2X↔1
describes S in the sense defined above and we define S = M; inj(r)T, then we get
X↔S as type of S and that for all x ∈ X and Y ∈ S it holds Sx,Y iff x ∈ Y . In
the Boolean matrix model this means that the sets of S are precisely described
by the columns of S, if the columns are considered as vectors of typs X↔1.
To model direct products X×Y of sets X and Y relation-algebraically, the
projection relations pi : X×Y ↔X and ρ : X×Y ↔Y are the convenient means.
They are the relational variants of the well-known projection functions and,
hence, fulfil for all u ∈ X×Y , x ∈ X and y ∈ Y the following equivalences:
piu,x iff u1 = x and ρu,y iff u2 = y. Here u1 denotes the first component of u
and u2 the second component. As a general assumption, in the remainder of the
paper we always assume a pair u to be of the form u = (u1, u2). Then uˆ denotes
the transposed pair (u2, u1). The projection relations enable us to specify the
well-known pairing operation of functional programming relation-algebraically.
The pairing of R : Z↔X and S : Z↔Y is defined as [R,S]] = R;piT ∩ S; ρT :
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Z↔X×Y . where pi and ρ are as above. Point-wisely this definition says that
[R,S]]z,u iff Rz,u1 and Sz,u2 , for all z ∈ Z and u ∈ X×Y . Based on pi and ρ we
are also able to establish a bijective correspondence between the relations of type
X↔Y and the vectors of type X×Y ↔1. The transformation of R : X↔Y into
its corresponding vector vec(R) : X×Y ↔1 is given by vec(R) = (pi;R∩ρ);  L and
the step back from r : X×Y ↔1 to its corresponding relation rel(r) : X↔Y
by rel(r) = piT; (ρ ∩ r;  L). Point-wisely this means that for all u ∈ X×Y the
following equivalences are true: vec(R)u iff Ru1,u2 and rel(r)u1,u2 iff ru.
3 A Relation-algebraic Model of Condorcet Voting
Usually, an election consists of a non-empty and finite set N of voters (agents),
normally N = {1, . . . , n}, a non-empty and finite set A of alternatives (candi-
dates), the individual preferences (choices, wishes) of the voters and a voting
rule that aggregates the winners from the individual preferences. A well-known
voting rule is the Condorcet voting rule. Here it is usually assumed that each
voter ranks the alternatives from top to bottom, i.e., the individual preferences
of the voters i ∈ N are expressed via linear strict orders >i : A↔A. From them
the dominance relation C : A↔A is computed that specifies the collective pref-
erences. An instance of a Condorcet election consists of the sets N , A, and the
relations >i for all i ∈ N . In the following we consider the approach that Ca,b
iff the number of voters i with a >i b is (strictly) greater than the number of
voters i with b >i a. In this case we also say that a beats b with p points, where
p is the (positive) difference between these numbers. It is known that C may
contain cycles and that an alternative that dominates all other ones – a so-called
Condorcet winner – does not necessarily exist. To get around this problem, in
the literature so-called choice sets have been introduced which take over the role
of the best alternative and specify the winners (see e.g., [14] for more details).
In this paper, we will study the choice set Uncovered Set.
For a relation-algebraic treatment of Condorcet voting, we first model its
input, i.e., the individual preferences of the voters, accordingly.
Definition 3.1 The relation P : N↔A2 models the instance (N,A, (<i)i∈N )
of a Condorcet election if Pi,u is equivalent to u1 >i u2, for all i ∈ N and u ∈ A2.
In the following RelView picture an input relation P is shown. The labels of
the rows and columns indicate that the voters are the natural numbers from 1
to 13 and the alternatives are the eight letters from a to h.
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It is troublesome to identify from this picture the individual preferences. But
if we select the single rows, transpose them to obtain vectors of type A2↔1
and apply the function rel of Section 2 to the latter, then RelView depicts the
individual preferences as Boolean matrices. For the rows 1, 4, 7 and 10 we get,
in the same order, the following Boolean matrices for >1, >4, >7 and >11:
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
Now, the preferences of the single voters are easy to see1. Voters 1 to 3 rank
their alternatives from top to bottom as a, c, e, g, b, d, f, h, voters 4 to 6 as
a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, voters 7 to 9 as b, a, d, c, f, e, h, g and the remaining voters
10 to 13 as h, g, f, e, a, b, c, d. The procedure also shows how to construct, in
general, the input P : N↔A2 from strict orders >i ; A↔A by inverting it. We
have to number the voters from 1 to n, then to transform each relation >i into
vec(>i)
T : 1↔A2, i.e., the transpose of its corresponding vector, and finally to
combine the transposed vectors row by row into a Boolean matrix. The latter
means that we have to form the relation-algebraic sum vec(>1)
T+· · ·+vec(>n)T.
We won’t to go into details with regard to sums of relations and refer to [19],
where a relation-algebraic specification via injection relations is given. Instead,
we demonstrate how to get from the individual preferences relation P the col-
lective preferences, i.e., the dominance relation C. In what follows, we assume
the projection relations pi, ρ : A2↔A of the direct product A2 to be at hand as
well as the membership relation M : N↔ 2N and the size comparison relation
S : 2N↔ 2N . Each of these relations is available in RelView via a pre-defined
function and their BDD-implementations are rather small. See [15,16] for details.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that P : N↔A2 models an instance of Condorcet vot-
ing. If we specify relations E,F : A2↔ 2N and C : A↔A by
E = syq(P,M) F = syq(P ; [ρ, pi]],M) C = rel((E ∩ F ; (S ∩ ST ));  L),
then Cu1,u2 is equivalent to |{i ∈ N | Pi,u}| > |{i ∈ N | Pi,uˆ}|, for all u ∈ A2.
Proof. For the given u ∈ A2 we prove in a preparatory step for all Y ∈ 2N that
Eu,Y ⇐⇒ syq(P,M)u,Y
⇐⇒ ∀ i ∈ N : Pi,u ↔ Mi,Y
⇐⇒ ∀ i ∈ N : Pi,u ↔ i ∈ Y
⇐⇒ {i ∈ N | Pi,u} = Y.
Using that the exchange relation [ρ, pi]] : A2↔A2 relates the pair u precisely
with its transposition uˆ = (u2, u1), in a rather similar way we can prove that for
1 A still more appropriate method is to compute for each relation >i its Hasse diagram
in the sense of [18] and to draw the latter in RelView as directed graphs.
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all Z ∈ 2N the following property holds:
Fu,Z ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N | Pi,uˆ} = Z
By means of these two auxiliary results, we now conclude the proof as follows:
Cul,u2 ⇐⇒ rel((E ∩ F ; (S ∩ ST ));  L)u1,u2
⇐⇒ ((E ∩ F ; (S ∩ ST ));  L)u
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ 2N : Eu,Y ∧ (F ; (S ∩ ST ))u,Y ∧  LY
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ 2N : Eu,Y ∧ ∃Z ∈ 2N : Fu,Z ∧ SZ,Y ∧ ¬SY,Z
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ 2N : Eu,Y ∧ ∃Z ∈ 2N : Fu,Z ∧ |Z| ≤ |Y | ∧ |Y | > |Z|
⇐⇒ ∃Y,Z ∈ 2N : {i ∈ N | Pi,u} = Y ∧ {i ∈ N | Pi,uˆ} = Z ∧ |Z| < |Y |
⇐⇒ |{i ∈ N | Pi,u}| > |{i ∈ N | Pi,uˆ}| 
The specifications of Theorem 3.1 can be executed by means of RelView after a
straightforward translation into its programming language. In case of the above
input relation P the tool computed the following dominance relation C. From
the first row of C we see that alternative a is tha Condorcet winner since it
dominates all other alternatives.
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
This relation is not only asymmetric (i.e., satisfies C∩CT = Ø) but also complete
(i.e., satisfies I ⊆ C ∪ CT). Altogether, C is a tournament relation and this
property implies the uniqueness of a Condorcet winner in the case that one
exists. How to compute, in general, from the dominance relation C the choice
sets using relation-algebraic means is demonstreted in [4].
4 Control of Condorcet Voting by Deleting Voters
We only consider the constructive variant of the control problem for Condorcet
voting, where control is done by deleting voters. Usually, the task is formulated as
a minimization-problem: Given a specific alternative a∗, determine a minimum
set of voters Y such that the removal of Y from the set N of all voters makes a∗
to a winner2. To allow for an easier relation-algebraic representation, we consider
the dual maximization-problem, i.e., we ask for a maximum set of voters X such
that a∗ wins subject to the condition that only voters from X are allowed to
vote. It is obvious that from X then a desired Y is obtained via Y = N \X.
We start with the assumption that ‘to win’ means ‘to be a Condorcet winner’.
As shown in [2], Condorcet voting is computationally resistant to our control type
2 The destructive veriant of our control problem asks for a minimum set of voters the
removal of which prevents win of a∗.
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in case of this specification of winners. I.e., it is NP-hard to decide, for a∗ ∈ A
and k ∈ N as inputs, whether it is possible to find k voters whose removal makes
a∗ to a Condorcet winner.
As a first step towards a solution of the maximization-problem, we relativize
the dominance relation C by additionally considering the sets of voters X which
only are allowed to vote. Concretely this means that we specify a relation R
that relates X ∈ 2N with a, b ∈ A iff |{i ∈ X | a >i b}| > |{i ∈ X | b >i a}|.
Since we work with binary relations, we have to combine two of the three objects
X, a and b to a pair. We do this with a and b, i.e., relate X with u under the
assumption that u1 equals a and u2 equals b. Then the following theorem shows
how the relativized dominance relation R : 2N↔A2 can be specified relation-
algebraically. Again we assume the relations pi, ρ : A2↔A, M : N↔ 2N and
S : 2N↔ 2N to be at hand.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose again that P : N↔A2 models an instance of Condorcet
voting. If we specify relations E,F : 2N×A2↔ 2N and R : 2N↔A2 by
E = syq([M, P ]],M) F = syq([M, P ; [ρ, pi]]]],M) R = rel((E ∩ F ; (S∩ ST ));  L),
then RX,u is equivalent to |{i ∈ X | Pi,u}| > |{i ∈ X | Pi,uˆ}|, for all X ∈ 2N
and u ∈ A2.
Proof. Assume arbitrary objects X ∈ 2N and u ∈ A2 to be given. Then, we have
for all Y ∈ 2N the following equivalence:
E(X,u),Y ⇐⇒ syq([M, P ]],M)(X,u),Y
⇐⇒ ∀ i ∈ N : [M, P ]]i,(X,u) ↔ Mi,Y
⇐⇒ ∀ i ∈ N : Mi,X ∧ Pi,u ↔ Mi,Y
⇐⇒ ∀ i ∈ N : i ∈ X ∧ Pi,u ↔ i ∈ Y
⇐⇒ {i ∈ X | Pi,u} = Y
In a similae way we can show for all Z ∈ 2N the following fact, using the property
of the exchange relation [ρ, pi]] : A2↔A2 mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3.1:
F(X,u),Z ⇐⇒ {i ∈ X | Pi,uˆ} = Z.
Now, the following calculation shows the claim:
RX,u ⇐⇒ rel((E ∩ F ; (S ∩ ST ));  L)X,u
⇐⇒ ((E ∩ F ; (S ∩ ST ));  L)(X,u)
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ 2N : E(X,u),Y ∧ (F ; (S ∩ ST ))(X,u),Y ∧  LY
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ 2N : E(X,u),Y ∧ ∃Z ∈ 2N : F(X,u),Z ∧ SZ,Y ∧ ¬SY,Z
⇐⇒ ∃Y,Z ∈ 2N : {i ∈ X | Pi,u} = Y ∧ {i ∈ X | Pi,uˆ} = Z ∧ |Z| < |Y |
⇐⇒ |{i ∈ X | Pi,u}| > |{i ∈ X | Pi,uˆ}| 
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In the second step, we now take the relativized dominance relation R of Theorem
4.1 and specify with its help a vector cand : 2N↔1 that describes the subset of
2N the members of which are the sets X which are candidates for the solution of
our control problem. The latter property means that a∗ is a Condorcet winner,
provided that only voters from X are allowed to vote. From the vector cand
we then finally compute the vector description sol : 2N↔1 of the maximum
candidate sets, which are the solutions we are looking for. The next theorem
shows how to get cand and sol from R and a∗.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that R : 2N↔A2 is the relation specified in Theorem
4.1 and that the specific alternative a∗ ∈ A is described by the point p : A↔1.
If we specify vectors cand, sol : 2N↔1 by
cand = R ; (pi; p ∩ ρ; p ) sol = cand ∩ ST ; cand ,
then the set {X ∈ 2N | ∀ b ∈ A\{a∗} : |{i ∈ X | Pi,(a∗,b)}| > |{i ∈ X | Pi,(b,a∗)}|}
is described by cand and the set of its maximum sets by sol.
Proof. Since p describes a∗, for all u ∈ A2 we have (pi; p)u iff u1 = a∗ and ρ; p u
iff u2 6= a∗. We now assume an arbitrary set X ∈ 2N and calculate as follows,
where in the fifth step Theorem 4.1 is applied:
candX ⇐⇒ R ; (pi; p ∩ ρ; p )X
⇐⇒ ¬∃u ∈ A2 : RX,u ∧ (pi; p)u ∧ ρ; p u
⇐⇒ ¬∃u ∈ A2 : RX,u ∧ u1 = a∗ ∧ u2 6= a∗
⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ A2 : u1 = a∗ ∧ u2 6= a∗ → RX,u
⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ A2 : u1 = a∗ ∧ u2 6= a∗ → |{i ∈ X | Pi,u}| > |{i ∈ X | Pi,uˆ}|
⇐⇒ ∀ b ∈ A : b 6= a∗ → |{i ∈ X | Pi,(a∗,b)}| > |{i ∈ X | Pi,(b,a∗)}|
⇐⇒ ∀ b ∈ A \ {a∗} : |{i ∈ X | Pi,(a∗,b)}| > |{i ∈ X | Pi,(b,a∗)}|
Hence, the first claim follows from the definition of the set a vector describes. To
prove the second claim, we take again an arbitrary set X ∈ 2N . Then, we get:
solX ⇐⇒ (cand ∩ ST ; cand )X
⇐⇒ candX ∧ ST ; cand X
⇐⇒ candX ∧ ¬∃Y ∈ 2N : S Y,X ∧ candY
⇐⇒ candX ∧ ∀Y ∈ 2N : candY → SY,X
⇐⇒ candX ∧ ∀Y ∈ 2N : candY → |Y | ≤ |X|
This equivalence implies that sol describes the set of maximum sets of voters X
for which candX holds, that is, for which a
∗ wins subject to the condition that
only voters from X are allowed to vote. 
Using RelView we have solved our control problem with Condorcet winners
as winning alternatives for the above input relation P and each of the eight
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alternatives. The tool showed that only the alternatives a, b and h can made to
Condorcet winners by deleting voters. Some of the results for these alternatives
are presented in the following six RelView pictures:
1
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11
12
13
1
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d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
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a
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c
d
e
f
g
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a b c d e f g h
The vector on position 1 says that a is a Condorcet winner if all voters are
allowed to vote and the corresponding dominance relation on position 2 is the
original dominance relation C. To make b to a Condorcet winner at least eight
voters must be deleted. Altogether there are 45 possibilities for this. The vector
on position 3 shows one of them, where the voters from 1 to 6 and the voters 10
and 11 are deleted. On position 4 the resulting dominance relation is depicted.
To get h as Condorcet winner requires a removal of at least six voters. According
to RelView there are 85 possibilities for this. One of them and the resulting
dominance relation are depicted at positions 5 and 6.
Since Condorcet winners do not always exist, choice sets have been introduced
as a general concept that always allows to define the winners of Condorcet voting.
In the remainder of this section we treat a well-known example, the uncovered
set. This choice set is usually defined via an induced transitive subrelation of the
dominance relation C, called covering relation. In the literature different such
relations are discussed. We concentrate on a relation G : A↔A that in [8] is
called Gilles covering and in [5] upward covering. Its usual point-wise definition
says that Ga,b iff Ca,b and for all c ∈ A from Cc,a it follows Cc,b, for all a, b ∈ A.
This relation-algebraically can be specified as equation G = C ∩ CT; C . The
(Gilles or upward) uncovered set is the set of all a ∈ A such that there exists
no b ∈ A \ {a} with Gb,a. It is non-empty because G is a strict-order and A is
finite. To the best of our knowledge, the computational complexity of control
problems for Condorcet elections with winning conditions different from being
a Condorcet winner has not been studied in the literature. We obtain the first
result in this direction by proving that the problem to control Condorcet elections
with upward covering by deleting voters is NP-hard (see Section 5). To solve our
control problem for this specification of winners we use the same idea as in the
relativization of the relation C to the relation R by additionally considering the
set of voters X which are allowed to vote. The next theorem shows how to obtain
the relativized covering relation U from the relativized dominance relation R.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose again that R : 2N↔A2 is the relation specified in The-
orem 4.1. If we specify relations E : A2×A2↔A2 and U : 2N×A2↔ 2N by
E = [pi; ρT, ρ; ρT]]
T ∩ vec(pi;piT);  L U = R ∩ [R, R ]];E ,
then for all X ∈ 2N and u ∈ A2 we have
UX,u ⇐⇒ RX,u ∧ ∀ c ∈ A : RX,(c,u1) → RX,(c,u2).
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Proof. Let X ∈ 2N and u ∈ A2 be given. In a first step we show for all v, w ∈ A2
the following property, where we use the equivalence of (pi; ρT)u,v and u1 = v2,
of (ρ; ρT)u,w and u2 = w2, and of (pi;pi
T)v,w and v1 = w1:
E(v,w).u ⇐⇒ ([pi; ρT, ρ; ρT]]T ∩ vec(pi;piT);  L)(v,w),u
⇐⇒ [pi; ρT, ρ; ρT]]u,(v,w) ∧ (vec(pi;piT);  L)(v,w),u
⇐⇒ (pi; ρT)u,v ∧ (ρ; ρT)u,w ∧ vec(pi;piT)(v,w)
⇐⇒ u1 = v2 ∧ u2 = w2 ∧ (pi;piT)v,w
⇐⇒ u1 = v2 ∧ u2 = w2 ∧ v1 = w1
We now can calculate as follows to conclude the proof:
UX,u ⇐⇒ (R ∩ [R, R ]];E )X,u
⇐⇒ RX,u ∧ [R, R ]];E X,u
⇐⇒ RX,u ∧ ¬∃ v, w ∈ A2 : [R, R ]]X,(v,w) ∧ E(v,w),u
⇐⇒ RX,u ∧ ¬∃ v, w ∈ A2 : RX,v ∧ RX,w ∧ u1 = v2 ∧ u2 = w2 ∧ v1 = w1
⇐⇒ RX,u ∧ ¬∃ c ∈ A : RX,(c,u1) ∧ RX,(c,u2)
⇐⇒ RX,u ∧ ∀ c ∈ A : RX,(c,u1) → RX,(c,u2) 
After this result we are able to solve our control problem also for the uncovered
set as set of winners. We use again a vector cand for the description of the
candidate sets and a vector sol for the description of the sulutions.
Theorem 4.4 Suppose that U : 2N↔A2 is the relation specified in Theorem
4.3 and that the specific alternative a∗ ∈ A is described by the point p : A↔1.
If we specify vectors cand, sol : 2N↔1 by
cand = U ; (pi; p ∩ ρ; p) sol = cand ∩ ST ; cand ,
then the set {X ∈ 2N | ¬∃ b ∈ A \ {a∗} : UX(b,a∗)} is described by cand and the
set of its maximum sets by sol.
Proof. Because a∗ is described by p, for all u ∈ A2 we have pi; p u iff u1 6= a∗
and (ρ; p)u iff u2 = a
∗. Now, for all X ∈ 2N we can calculate as follows to show
the first claim (for the second claim cf. the proof of Theorem 4.2).
candX ⇐⇒ U ; (pi; p ∩ ρ; p)X
⇐⇒ ¬∃u ∈ A2 : UX,u ∧ pi; p u ∧ (ρ; p)u
⇐⇒ ¬∃u ∈ A2 : UX,u ∧ u1 6= a∗ ∧ u2 = a∗
⇐⇒ ¬∃ b ∈ A : UX,(b,a∗) ∧ b 6= a∗
⇐⇒ ¬∃ b ∈ A \ {a∗} : UX,(b,a∗) 
As already mentioned, the uncovered set is always non-empty. The degenerate
case is that no voter is allowed to vote. Then the resulting dominance relation
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as well as the induced covering relation are empty and, thus, the uncovered set
equals N . RelView showed that in our running example this situation occurs
if c or d shall win. We already know that a wins without a removal of voters. By
reason of the tool at least five voters must be deleted to ensure win for e, f, g or
h and the corresponding numbers of possibilities are 11, 111, 15 and 126. And,
finally, b becomes winning if at least seven voters are not allowed to vote. To
reach the goal there exist 120 possibilities. We end this section with the following
three RelView pictures that concern alternative e:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a b c d e f g h
The vector shows that e is in the uncovered set if the voters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6
are deleted, the relation in the middle is the dominance relation resulting from
this, and the relation on the right is the induced covering relation. The empty
columns show that, besides e, the removal also make a, f and h uncovered.
5 Control Remains Hard if Uncovered Alternatives Win
As already mentioned, in [2] it is shown that for Condorcet voting constructive
control by deleting voters is NP-hard if Condorcet winners are defined as winners.
In this section we prove that this result remains true if instead of Condorcet
winners the uncovered alternatives are taken. To this end we first introduce the
following problem that we will be used in our reduction.
Definition 5.1 The problem X4C ( exact cover by 4-sets) is the following:
Input: Sets S1, . . . , Sk ∈ 2{1,...,n} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} it holds
|Si| = 4 and |{i | j ∈ Si}| = 3 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Question: Is there some set I ∈ 2{1,...,k} such that ⋃i∈I Si = {1, . . . , n} and
Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ I with i 6= j?
Note that if an I as required exists, then |I| = 14n, since each Si has cardinality 4
and the union must have cardinality n. On the other hand, if an I with
⋃
i∈I Si =
{1, . . . , n} exists and |I| = 14n, then by a simple counting argument, Si ∩Sj = ∅
for all i, j ∈ I with i 6= j. Also, the value k in the problem instance must
necessarily be equal to 34n, since each Si has 4 elements and each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
appears in exactly 3 of the sets Si. In particular, it follows that n is a multiple
of 4 in every instance fo X4C. The following result is mentioned without proof
in [9], we give the complete proof:
Lemma 5.1 The problem X4C is NP-hard.
12 Rudolf Berghammer and Henning Schnoor
Proof. We reduce from a special version of the 1-in-3-satisfiability problem, called
1-in-3-Sat′ and introduced in [9]. An instance of 1-in-3-Sat′ is a formula of the
form ϕ =
∧n
i=1 1-in-3(x
i
1, x
i
2, x
i
3), where 1-in-3(x, y, z) is a clause which is true iff
exactly one of the variables x, y, and z is true. Additionally, ϕ has the following
properties: In each clause the 3 appearing variables are distinct, and each variable
appears in exactly 4 clauses. Note that this implies that the number of distinct
variables in ϕ is 34n.
An instance ϕ of the problem 1-in-3-Sat′ can be transferred into an instance
of X4C as follows:
– Each of the n clauses in ϕ becomes a set element of {1, . . . , n}, which we can
then rename to values 1, . . . , n.
– Each variable xi becomes a set Si containing the clauses in which xi appears.
First assume that ϕ is satisfiable. Then there is an assignment I with I |= ϕ.
Since I satisfies exactly one variable in each clause, we know that n variable oc-
currances are satisfied by I. Since each variable, in particular each of the satisfied
variables, appears in 4 clauses, we get that 14n many variables are satisfied by I.
We can naturally interpret I as the set of indices i with I |= xi and claim that I
satisfies the conditions of X4C. As mentioned above, since |I| = 14n, it suffices to
show that
⋃
i∈I = {1, . . . , n}. This follows from the construction: Since I (seen
as a truth assignment to the variables) satisfies each clause, we know that for
each clause, there is a variable satisfied by I. For the X4C instance, this implies
tha for each element i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is an index j ∈ I with i ∈ Sj .
For the converse, assume that there is an index set I satisfying the conditions
of X4C. We can interpret I as a truth assignment for the variables in ϕ in the
obvious way: A variable is set to 1 iff its corresponding set is in the selection
I. We show that I, seen as a truth assignment, satisfies the formula ϕ. Hence
let 1-in-3(xi1, x
i
2, x
i
3) be a clause in ϕ. Since I is a set cover, we know that for
this clause, an element containing the set element corresponding to the clause is
selected in I. Hence I satisfies at least one of the variables xi1, x
i
2, and x
i
3. Since
I is an exact cover, we also know that each set element appears only in one of
the selected sets, hence only one of the variables is true, and we are done. 
We can now show the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.1 For Condorcet voting the constructive control problem by deleting
voters is NP-hard if the uncovered alternatives are specified as the winners.
Proof. We reduce from X4C, which is NP-hard due to Lemma 5.1. So, let an X4C-
instance consisting of the sets S1, . . . , S 3
4n
be given. Without loss of generality we
assume n ≥ 16. From the instance, we construct an election E as follows. First we
define t = 14n−2 (recall that in every instance to X4C, n is a multiple of 4, hence
t is always an integer). Next we introduce alternatives a∗ (the alternative that
has to win), s1, . . . , sn and b1, . . . , bn. Finally, we introduce the following four
groups of individual preferences, where S6=i = {sj | j 6= i}, B 6=i = {bj | j 6= i},
B/∈Si = {bj | j /∈ Si} and B∈Si = {bj | j ∈ Si}.
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1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we use t linear strict orders of the form S6=i > si >
bi > B6=i > a∗.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we use t linear strict orders of the form B 6=i > a∗ >
si > bi > S6=i.
3. For each set Si we use a linear strict order of the formB/∈Si > a
∗ > S > B∈Si .
4. We use a linear strict order of the form a∗ > S > B.
The notation of preferences (linear strict orders) using sets means that the or-
der of the alternatives inside the sets is irrelevant. For instance, a∗ > S > B
means that in the linear strict order a∗ is the greatest element, then the alterna-
tives s1, . . . , sn follow in any order and, finally, the alternatives b1, . . . , bn follow,
again in any order. Note that, by definition of X4C, we get |B/∈Si | = n − 4 and
|B∈Si | = 4. Now, the question in our constructed instance of the control problem
is whether the specific alternative a∗ can be made uncovered by deleting at most
1
4n linear strict orders (i.e., voters).
We first study the relationship between each of the relevant alternatives in
the constructed election before any deletion of voters is performed. Note that if
the point difference between two alternatives is at least 14n+ 1, then deleting at
most 14n linear strict orders cannot change which of these alternatives dominates
the other.
Each bi beats a
∗ with at least 14n+ 1 points. To see this, we consider all
preferences introduced in the election. For each j 6= i, the 2t linear strict
orders of the first two groups place bi ahead of a
∗. From the linear strict
orders introduced for i, one puts bi ahead of a
∗ and the other puts a∗ ahead
of bi. We now consider the linear strict orders introduced for the sets Sj :
There are 3 sets Sj in which i appears (these place a
∗ ahead of bi) and i
does not appear in the remaining 34n− 3 many (these place bi ahead of a∗).
Finally, a∗ > S > B put a∗ ahead of bi. Hence the lead of bi over a∗ is
(n− 1) · 2 · t+ 3
4
n− 6− 1 = 2(n− 1)t+ 3
4
n− 7
which is at least 14n+ 1, since we assumed n ≥ 16.
Alternative a∗ beats each si with at least 14n+ 1 points. Note that half
of the linear strict orders introduced in the first two groups place si ahead
of a∗ and the other half put a∗ ahead of si. Hence a∗ and si tie in the sub-
election consisting of these linear strict orders. In the 34n linear strict orders
introduced for the sets Si, however, a
∗ is always placed ahead of si. Finally,
a∗ is ahead of si in a∗ > S > B. As a consequence a∗ beats each si with
3
4n+ 1 many points, which is at least
1
4n+ 1.
If i 6= j, then bi beats sj with at least 14n+ 1 points. To see that this is
true, note that the linear strict orders introduced in the first two groups
are neutral between bi and sj , as half of them have bi ahead of sj and the
other half have sj ahead of bi (recall that i 6= j). Now consider the linear
strict orders introduced for the sets Si. There are 3 such orders which place
sj ahead of bi (the ones corresponding to sets Sl with i ∈ Sl), and the re-
maining 34n− 3 many place bi ahead of sj (these are the ones corresponding
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to sets Sl with i /∈ Sl). In a∗ > S > B, si is voted ahead of bi. Hence bi
beats sj by
3
4n− 7 points, which is at least 14n+ 1, since again n ≥ 16.
Alternative bi beats si with exactly
1
4n− 3 points. This holds due to the
following: The linear strict orders introduced in the first two groups for j 6= i
are neutral with respect to the relationship between si and bi (half of them
put si ahead of bi, the other half put bi ahead of si). The 2t many linear
strict orders introduced for i in the first two groups all put si ahead of bi.
Now we consider the linear strict orders introduced for the sets Sj . If i ∈ Sj ,
then si is ahead of bi here, this happens 3 times. In the remaining
3
4n − 3
linear strict orders introduced for the sets Sj , we have that i /∈ Sj and hence
in these linear strict orders, bi is ahead of si. In a
∗ > S > B the alternative
si is voted ahead of bi. Together we have that bi beats si with
−2t− 3 + 3
4
n− 3− 1 = 3
4
n− 2t− 7
votes. Since t = 14n− 2, it follows that 34n− 2t− 7 = 14n− 3 as required.
In particular, it follows that by deleting at most 14n voters, the only relevant
relationships that can be influenced are those between bi and si (we will see that
the relationships between bi and bj or si and sj for i 6= j are not relevant).
We now show that the reduction is correct: The instance of X4C is positive
iff a∗ can be made a winner of the election using the Condorcet criterion with
uncovered set by deleting at most 14n linear strict orders.
First, assume that the instance is positive, and let I be a corresponding index
set. We delete the 14n linear strict orders corresponding to the elements in I and
denote the resulting election with E′. Then a∗ indeed is uncovered in E′. To
show this, it suffices to prove that none of the bi covers a
∗, since a∗ wins against
all of the si (since a
∗ leads against si with at least 14n+1 linear strict orders, this
remains true also after deleting at most 14n linear strict orders). Hence, assume
that some bi covers a
∗ in E′. It suffices to prove that si dominates bi in E′, then,
since a∗ dominates si in E′, it follows that bi does not cover a∗. Note that in
the original election E the alternative bi beats si with
1
4n − 3 points. Deleting
the 14n linear strict orders corresponding to I has the following effect:
a) For the deleted linear strict orders corresponding to sets Sj with i /∈ Sj ,
the alternative si gains a point against bi. Since i appears in exactly one of
the chosen and 14n linear strict orders are deleted, this means that si gains
1
4n− 1 points against bi from these linear strict orders.
b) For the single deleted linear strict order corresponding to a set Sj with i ∈ Sj ,
the alternative si loses a point against bi.
Hence altogether, si gains
1
4n− 2 points against bi and, thus, now beats bi with
a single point. Therefore, as claimed, bi does not cover a
∗.
For the converse direction, assume that it is possible to make a∗ a winner
of the election by deleting at most 14n linear strict orders. Again, let E
′ be the
election resulting from E by the deletions. Since the relatinship between the
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bi’s and a
∗ cannot be changed by deleting at most 14n linear strict orders and
bi wins against a
∗ in the original election E, all bi also win against a∗ in E′.
Since a∗ is a winner in E′, it follows that for each bi there must be a alternative
dominating bi who does not dominate a
∗. Since for i 6= j, we know that bi wins
against sj in the election E
′, it follows that for all relevant i the alternative si
wins against bi in E
′. Since bi wins against si with 14n− 3 points, it follows that
each si must gain at least
1
4n−2 points against bi by the removal of linear strict
orders. Hence n( 14n − 2) = 14n2 − 2n points need to be gained collectively by
all si against their corresponding bi. Obviously, only deleting linear strict orders
introduced for the sets Sj helps to let si gain points against bi. Deleting one of
these linear strict orders gains n − 8 points (since it hurts for the 4 values of i
with i ∈ Sj , and helps the remaining n − 4 ones). Hence, by deleting 14n linear
strict orders we can gain at most 14n · (n − 8) = 14n2 − 2n points. Since this is
the total number of points that need to be gained, we know that exactly 14n
linear strict orders are deleted to obtain the election E′, and each of these linear
strict orders is one introduced for a set Sj . Now assume that there is some i such
that two linear strict orders corresponding to sets Sj1 and Sj2 are deleted, where
i ∈ Sj1 and i ∈ Sj2 and j1 6= j2. Then si gains a point against bi in at most
1
4n− 2 of the deletions and loses in at least 2 of them. Hence, si gains at most
1
4n−4 points against bi and this implies that si loses against bi in E′, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, it follows that each i is contained in at most one of the
Sj whose corresponding linear strict order is deleted. Due to cardinality reasons
( 14n linear strict orders corresponding to sets of 4 elements each are deleted),
it follows that each i appears in exactly one set. As a consequence, we have
obtained a set cover as required. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the relation-algebraic approach can be
used to solve NP-hard problems from Social Choice Theory. In particular, this
shows how Computer Algebra tools can be used to obtain practical algorithms
for hard problems without relying on domain knowledge for optimizations. Our
results support the point of view that proving NP-hardness is not sufficient in
order to conclude that a voting system is “safe” from attempts to influence the
outcome of an election. In addition to the execution of algorithms, RelView also
provides us with visualizations of both the input and output of the algorithms
and some further features that support scientific experiments, like step-wise ex-
ecution, test of properties and generation of random relations. All this makes
the approach especially appropriate for prototyping and experimentation, and
as such very instructive scientific research as well as for university education.
An interesting open question is whether similar problems from the Social
Choice literature, as for example the manipulation problem mentioned in the
introduction, can also be solved with RelView or other Computer Algebra
tools.
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